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Abstract 
Examines non-linear adaptation to change in the high-technology environment of the computer 
industry. These environments are defined, and the efficacy of different organizational adaptations is 
assessed with respect to these environments. Results from our analyses show that there is a direct 
and causal relationship between the employment of non-linear organizational archetypes and 
organizational effectiveness within high-technology industries. 
Introduction  
The last two decades of the twentieth century are witnessing a rapid growth in the amount of 
technological development in the USA and abroad. In fact, it is estimated that more unrefined 
scientific discoveries have been made within this time than in all prior periods combined. Invariably, 
the pattern of this progress has been unevenly biased toward the development of high-technology 
sectors. These sectors are readily defined through their high research and development costs as a 
percentage of total costs. Also, the incremental costs of producing these items are low once a 
commercially viable design has been developed.  
The most prominent example of hightechnology development certainly is that of the computer 
industry and its supporting businesses. Within these disciplines the rate of development has resulted 
in computing power doubling every 18 months (Maital, 1994, p. 140). This growth has brought with it 
the development of technologies and associated business sectors that were all but unknown only a few 
years prior. Customers of high-technology computer products have thus demanded successive 
technological changes to keep pace with these new capabilities. These same customers have also 
rejected investing in new and incompatible formats. The result of this expansion has been atypical 
rates of failure as many organizations have failed to adapt to these changes. Ultimately, firms within 
this sector have been forced to adapt to these demands at an unprecedented rate or face the ultimate 
measure of failure: technological and financial insolvency.  
Background and purpose  
Rapid technological growth, the sole development and subsequent distribution of continuous product 
innovations is cost prohibitive for all but a few organizations involved in the field of research and 
development within high-technology industries (Lamont et al., 1994). The underlying premise in 
examining this situation thus lies in addressing how organizations adapt to rapid technological change 
while promoting proprietary technological innovation. More specifically, when organizational 
knowledge has incrementally advanced in several disciplines, involved firms merge these 
complementary advances together, thus developing commercially viable products. A review of this 
process reveals that the manner in which these firms integrate thereby determines the proposed 
technological industry standard.  
First, in addressing the critical question of why specific firms are successful in promoting their inherent 
proprietary knowledge, researchers in the field have been concerned primarily with the investigation 
of how the organizations themselves choose potential technological collaborators. In contrast, scant 
attention has been paid to the manner in which sequential and chance technological innovation itself 
has regularly determined the subsequent organizational structure. As a rule, strategic technological 
alliances typically form only after technological advancements in several complementary fields have 
already occurred. That is to say, technological development precedes the development of collaborative 
organizational strategies and thus itself is critical in determining the choice of the organizational 
structures which will promote its distribution (Leavitt and Lipman-Blumen, 1995).  
Second, researchers have subsequently been concerned with the maintenance of technologically 
collaborative strategies. Their empirical efforts have concentrated mainly on the study of why specific 
organizational collaborative strategies are successful while others fail. However, with technological 
development regularly preceeding the development of successive organizational structures, firms 
possessing proprietary technical knowledge routinely form transitory alliances, but only with respect to 
the technologies in question. With a finite number of organizations involved in the development of 
computer technology, firms often find themselves collaborating with other organizations with respect 
to specific technologies while being solid rivals in the development of others (Usher and Evans, 1996; 
Zammuto and Cameron, 1985).  
Third, management researchers have focused their efforts upon empirically determining the firms' 
collaborative and organizational strategies of products currently under manufacture and their 
technological succession. However, the transitory nature of these technologically collaborative 
alliances often involves nothing more than agreements on how to merge each of the proprietary 
disciplines, how to develop standards, and how to construct licensing agreements to distribute 
subsequent revenues. This is an incremental process and proprietary knowledge is typically widely 
distributed to allow industry-wide integration and to generate maximum licensing revenues. The 
manufacture of these products is of secondary importance and is commonly licensed to other 
organizations. Consequently, a nation such as Singapore, with no stake in the development of disk 
drive technology in 1980, became the world's leading producer of these devices within two years 
(Maital, 1994, pp. 96-7). Notwithstanding, the majority of licensing revenues were repatriated to the 
USA, to those firms that were instrumental in developing the technologies and developing them into a 
commercially viable product (Maital, 1994, pp. 96-7).  
Given these considerations, the objectives of this study are:  
* to examine the character of transitory organizations that are formed to facilitate the distribution of 
complementary technological advances;  
* to investigate how organizations simultaneously enter into multiple cooperative and competitive 
agreements with a finite number of organizations based upon the distribution of proprietary 
knowledge; and  
* to understand how and why this collaborative process sustains itself though the stakeholding 
organizations face continual technological obsolescence.  
Characteristics of computer high-technology environments  
Non-linearity  
In order to define non-linearity, it is better to define its antithesis: linearity, as it is far simpler a 
concept to understand. Accordingly, linearity is the systematic methodology of proceeding from 
process to product. Typically, organizations define, plan, integrate, collaborate, and so forth, based 
upon a converging vision of some result or product. Thus, each incremental attempt, each sequential 
action, narrows the amount of uncertainty toward the attainment of the stated goal. Each step causes 
an integral unity of action that in some way contributes toward a predetermined end.  
The central theme in linearity is always that of convergence. Consequently, additional knowledge, 
capabilities, potential, and the like, are considered only with respect to their ability to attain the 
chosen, stated, limiting goal. The product is fixed, resolute and determined. The result is that the 
process is systematic and unchanging.  
In contrast, non-linearity can best be described as the process of divergence. Under these conditions, 
the more that an organization knows, the more it realizes how many variables there are and the more 
uncertain its future becomes. Non-linearity accepts that managerial decisions are made under the 
premise of bounded rationality. Thus, managers who have more information available to them have 
the ability to choose from a wider assortment of options. This results in indeterminacy using traditional 
linear methods of managerial thought.  
Non-linearity occurs, for example, when proprietary technological development precedes the 
formulation of an organizational strategy and the subsequent determination of an organizational 
structure. This repeatedly occurs in technologically innovative research and development driven 
environments: conditions that sustain perpetual development. The result is that management faces 
many different options with respect to developing this proprietary knowledge into a marketable 
technological product.  
What is needed at this time is the development of a non-linear understanding explaining 
organizational adaptation to rapid change within high-technology environments (Leavitt and Lipman-
Blumen, 1995). While many theories have addressed organizational change in response to 
environmental pressures, none has attempted to explain the dyadic relationship between transitory 
organizational structures and non-linear environments. It is in these cases that a paradigm shift 
occurs from functionalism to interpretivism; from malleability to control. With it, assumptions must be 
changed and organizations must see themselves as not being determined by the context, but as 
enacting it.  
To advance this understanding, the characteristics of the computer industry will be defined. 
Organizational adaptation to these changes within this environment will subsequently be specified. The 
result is that a review from a non-linear approach will delineate the factors necessary for effective 
adaptation within these environments.  
Technological succession  
An awareness of technological succession is critical in understanding the rapid changes in the 
computer industry over the last two decades. Prior to this period, only a handful of organizations 
possessed both the technical ability and the financial capital to solely develop unified computing 
systems. As such, these organizations were instrumental in the integrated development of hardware, 
software, and support peripherals. As the discipline progressed and brought technological 
obsolescence to existing systems, incremental changes occurred. However, the cost of implementing 
these changes was ordinarily the entire replacement of existing systems and the retraining of support 
personnel. With technological succession cost prohibitive for the majority of customers, successive 
change was slow.  
Fragmentation of the computer industry came with the advent of the first personal computers. While 
still being produced by the same handful of organizations, low cost allowed for individual computer 
ownership. Thus, a new market segment developed. New organizations formed to offer these 
consumers higher levels of product performance at lower costs as component costs fell. The computer 
software industry responded by offering operating systems that were able to cope with more memory, 
faster integrated circuits, and increasingly complex peripherals. The important characteristic for these 
operating systems was their compatibility with earlier software and peripherals. Each technological 
development could thus be implemented with only minor incremental changes in software or in 
hardware. This meant that technology could be successively employed without the prohibitive costs 
associated with replacing an entire computing system.  
Attempts to restrain this pattern of successive change through the introduction of incompatible 
technologies met with failure. Initial attempts by industry leaders such as IBM to re-acquire the ability 
to control the development of operating systems from Microsoft were unsuccessful. Similarly, the 
launch of its own brand of operating system, OS/2, failed.  
Integrated circuit manufacturers faced similar problems. Constrained by the requirement that 
integrated circuit chips must be reverse-compatible with previous software, the company leader, Intel, 
attempted to invent a seeming revolutionary change in the microchip industry through the 
introduction of the Pentium name. This attempt then met with failure as the consumer market saw 
that it was an evolutionary, not revolutionary, change in technology. Further, Intel made an initial 
attempt to define itself as the industry standard bearer and copyrighted the Pentium name for its 
admittedly incremental computer chip. This was done to profit from any doubts that consumers still 
maintained regarding compatibility of their competitors' computer chips with other industry products 
while indicating that it was the successor to the 80286, 80386, and 80486 legacy; hence the choice of 
Pentium. This effort to differentiate its product failed as initial examples of its integrated circuit chip 
contained inherent flaws. The result was competitors such as Cyrix and AMD used Intel's production 
problems to decrease confidence in the manufacturer and to increase their own market share.  
Finally, organizations that have successfully developed non-incremental proprietary knowledge have 
had their work relegated to specific, technologically appropriate niches. Accordingly, their influence 
has little effect on the technological succession that dictates industry and consumer standards. 
Organizations such as Apple, Silicon Graphics, and the like account for less than 3 percent of the 
overall consumer demand and thus have a negligible effect on industry standards. This is in spite of 
the fact that they are technologically superior in many respects. The reason for this is that, once 
proprietary technology has developed integral technical standards that have been accepted by 
industry and the consumer, incremental development has adhered to this standard as a rule. In short, 
when consumers demanded a graphical user interface similar to that of the Apple MacIntosh, they 
waited for Microsoft Windows rather than changing to an incompatible computing platform.  
Shared development of standards  
As stated earlier, the sole development and distribution of technological innovations is cost prohibitive 
for most organizations (Lamont et al., 1994). Also, when knowledge has incrementally advanced in 
several complementary disciplines, technological processes merge collections of these advances 
together into a commercially viable product. Typically, advancements in the same field parallel each 
other as rivals compete among one another to develop successive refinements to existing 
technologies. The result of this process is that at any one time multiple alternative proposals exist that 
advance their respective disciplines beyond their current state.  
Organizations that are instrumental in developing a proprietary ability do not solely attempt to 
produce a marketable technology. Rather, they seek to develop these standards collaboratively. 
Parallel development by any number of competitors generates the risk that rival alternatives become 
accepted as the industry standard. Accordingly, firms seek to diversify risk by dividing their efforts 
through developing multiple proprietary technologies within their area of specialization (Williamson, 
1975). Organizations that fail to adapt to change in this manner expose themselves to further risk any 
time that a technology advances beyond the proprietary ability of their respective organizations.  
The few firms that are successful at solely developing a potentially marketable technology risk it not 
being accepted without widespread integration into competitors' products and further industry 
support. Again, it must be remembered that, once a standard has been adopted, technological 
succession is the accepted means of furthering technical development.  
Sharing of technology  
With computer power doubling approximately every 18 months, any specific technological 
development within this industry has a life-cycle of short duration, typically less than two years 
(Maital, 1994, p. 140). For example, with respect to the development of the floppy disk alone, the 
respective standards have been: 8", 5.25", 5.25" double-sided, 5.25" high-density, 5.25" doublesided 
and high-density, 3.5", 3.5" double-sided, 3.5" high-density, and 3.5" double-sided and high-density. 
In all, these nine standards span a period of less than 20 years. Similarly, integrated circuit chips and 
virtually all other computer-related products can trace similar developments within their specific fields. 
Presently, the floppy disk itself is in the process of becoming obsolete as alternative technologies vie 
to replace magnetic media with recent advances in encoding and decoding optical media.  
As a result of these developments, maximum revenue from any specific technological development 
can only be derived through an industry-wide product distribution.  
Inescapably, this distribution must be accompanied with a disclosure of intrinsic product advances to 
allow integration into the various systems offered by each of the distributors within the industry (Dess 
et al., 1995). Thus, the distribution of integral technical standards diminishes any advantage in 
proprietary knowledge that the advancing firm has over its competitors (Dess et al., 1995). 
Consequently, even firms that are successful in an entirely marketable technological product must 
make their restrictive knowledge known in order to have their proprietary standard adopted. For this 
reason, firms must share their technological advances in order to profit from their efforts. In doing so, 
they advance the aggregate of knowledge of their competitors and thus ultimately commence the 
processes of obsolescence in the technology that they themselves are promoting.  
The compensation for having organizational proprietary knowledge integrated into an industry 
standard is the realistic expectation of atypical financial rewards during the relatively short life-cycle of 
product relevance. Once more, the rate of advancement of knowledge has caused incremental 
advances in technology to occur at an increasing rate. The result has been that, even after a specific 
technology has been accepted as an industry standard, its relevant life-cycle is being dated at its 
outset.  
Finally, technology is also shared through the licensing of manufacturing to outside organizations and 
even to competing firms. These licensed production agreements are also consistent with the 
understanding that many collaborators to the development of the licensed technology lack the 
financial ability or the desire to manufacture and distribute the products that their incremental 
knowledge has helped produce. Even in the presence of such capability, many of these firms elect to 
engage in further research and development within their specific discipline of expertise. Again, 
licensing agreements allow these companies to allocate production to other firms and free their 
respective finances for subsequent research and development (Dugal and Roy, 1996). This preserves 
the ability of collaborative firms to pursue further advances in their respective disciplines while 
allowing for earnings to be allocated in proportion to their technological contribution or in proportion to 
their ability or desire to produce the resultant product.  
The final consideration with respect to the sharing of technology is that the existence of a licensing 
agreement in no way limits the allied firms' abilities to subsequently license their respective 
proprietary knowledge. Uniformly, firms possessing this knowledge maintain the ability to license their 
specific disciplinary advances for the development of other products in the same, or in other 
industries. Likewise, when specific disciplinary advances become dated, technological succession 
dictates product evolution. Within the floppy disk drive example, the result was that a few initial 
proprietary advancements spanned several developmental iterations. Others, however, immediately 
became obsolete with the subsequent development of technology by competitors within the same 
discipline. Ultimately, the outcome of this behavior is the regular elimination of firms possessing dated 
proprietary knowledge and their subsequent replacement with the inherent knowledge of competing 
firms possessing further proprietary advances in those same disciplines.  
Attempts to create order in disordered environments  
Theoretical literature recognizes that the above-mentioned characteristics of these environments can 
be restricted through organizational diversification of risk (Williamson, 1975). A brief review of the 
outcome of these adaptive efforts is consequently in order. Following this is a review of the methods 
commonly employed by organizations to achieve these outcomes. Admittedly, such an effort is not an 
exhaustive review of academic literature justifying these adaptations, nor is it meant to be. 
Regardless, it does provide utility in this analysis by revealing the underlying assumptions inherent in 
these attempts. The overall suggestion is that certain organizational adaptations are more likely to be 
successful in high-technology industries while others appear to be inherently less suitable (Dugal and 
Roy, 1996).  
Outcomes  
Vertical expansion for risk diversification is generally employed by organizations when larger, typically 
industry-dominant firms seek to administer a majority of functions, from research and development 
through the sale and distribution of the finished product. In this manner, environmental change is 
controlled and order is created through the measured release of proprietary knowledge by these firms. 
Similarly, this outcome permits firms employing these tactics to impose guidelines upon the industry 
as well. The problem with this outcome, however, is that it is incompatible with high-technology 
industries such as the computer industry that have already experienced fragmentation. In these 
instances, no one specific firm is able to dominate the development and distribution of hardware, 
software, or peripherals. At present, the only organization even remotely able to demonstrate the 
fiscal potential for controlling all three facets of the computer industry is Microsoft. Here again, 
though, organizational dominance is limited only to software and even that capability is being strongly 
contested in the courts at the present time.  
In contrast, the foremost organizational outcome of horizontal expansion, in addition to its inherent 
diversification of risk, is additional exposure into new markets and alliances. Recently, computer 
industry firms within concentrated markets have used the need for this outcome to target other firms 
for technological alliances within incrementally developing areas and within fragmented markets 
(Chatterjee, 1991). Consequently, these organizations retain their ability to license their proprietary 
technologies to related products and services or to an expanded market (Porter, 1985). This allows 
firms to continue to specialize within their respective discipline while licensing proprietary technology 
for inclusion into a diverse variety of products. Alternately, this outcome is sought when organizations 
completely dominate their own initial markets and attempt to enter into similar or complementary 
markets (Porter, 1985). Finally, this result is sought by organizations attempting to create economies 
of scale (Williamson, 1975). The result is that research and development costs of proprietary 
knowledge are thus reduced as firms rationalize these costs as being essential for inclusion into a 
variety of commercially viable products.  
Merger and acquisition methods  
The method most often used to employ an outcome of horizontal, and to a much lesser extent in the 
computer industry, vertical expansion, is that of mergers and acquisitions. Alliances of this type 
involve the outright purchase of another organization to transfer firm-specific skills as well as firm-
based knowledge (Pablo, 1994). The actual distinction between merging or acquiring itself matters 
little since it is based upon whether or not the company targeted for purchase is liquidated as an 
individual entity or assimilated as a supporting organization. Thus, if liquidation is chosen, firm 
resources are pooled together and the process is labeled a merger. Conversely, if assimilation is 
chosen, the target organization is maintained as a subsidiary for financial reporting purposes and the 
operation is labeled an acquisition.  
Regardless of the financial reporting methodology employed during mergers and acquisitions, 
organizational changes precede, and subsequently enable, the flow of skills and knowledge between 
the firms with this method. These methods are unsuitable in technologically incremental environments 
where the technology, as a rule, precedes organizational adaptations to the resultant environment. 
Furthermore, the computer industry's disposition toward fragmentation and technological succession 
has caused organizations that have used these methods to face anti-trust issues commonly associated 
with these approaches. Thus, within the computer industry, this method has been relegated to the 
acquisition of organizations that are financially insolvent rather than organizations that offer additional 
proprietary knowledge to the acquiring firm.  
Strategic alliance methods  
Strategic alliances are used to achieve both vertical and horizontal expansion outcomes. These types 
of affiliations are typically enacted prior to the development of specific technologies within different 
disciplines (Gulati, 1995). Accordingly, organizations often employ this methodology when attempting 
to develop marketable products for which technologies have yet to be developed. The procedure 
typically involves a limited number of organizations entering into an agreement to jointly develop a 
commercially viable product. As with mergers and acquisitions, the structural process precedes the 
flow of skills and knowledge. However, the distinction is that the flow of knowledge is something that 
will optimistically develop as the result of the types of alliances.  
To date, the problem with strategic alliances in the computer industry is that they are inherently not 
technologically incremental. These alliances are adverse to the shared development of standards with 
firms outside these strategic alliances. In addition, these alliances involve the development of a legal 
structure that prescribes the further development of technology within each of the organizations' 
disciplines. As a rule, this incremental development is then limited to the members of the alliance 
within the inceptive strategic agreement.  
For example, IBM, Apple Computers, and Motorola began such a strategic alliance during the early 
1990s to develop and produce the Power PC computer. The intent of this alliance was to develop a 
commercially viable computer that incorporated a RISCbased Motorola microchip, was able to use the 
Apple Macintosh brand of operating system as well as Windows, and could be manufactured in 
different forms by IBM as well as Apple. Invariably, consumer response was appropriately cautious, 
industry support failed to develop, and the attempt was abruptly abandoned by all participants.  
The case for a non-linear perspective  
Typically, in lower-technology industries, structure precedes the development of technology. However, 
in high-technology industries, technology repeatedly precedes structure (Usher and Evans, 1996; 
Zammuto and Cameron, 1985). Accordingly, the linear paradigm is that the more structure an 
organization has, the more power and control it has. Whereas, under high-technology nonlinear 
conditions, the more structure it has, the more limited the organization becomes. This is consistent 
with the understanding that the development of bureaucratic structures slows the ability of an 
organization to make decisions. This then delays time to market and eliminates any first move 
advantage that an organization might possess.  
Similarly, under linear conditions, the paradigm is that the more an organization knows, the more 
power and control it has. Whereas, under non-linear conditions the more it knows, the more it realizes 
how many variables there are, and the more uncertain its future becomes. The result is that 
hightechnology surroundings are neither determinable nor quantifiable using existing archetypes.  
The advantage of a non-linear approach Non-linear technological ventures differ from other alliances 
in that they are transient organizations that are clearly defined in structure, the distribution of 
knowledge, and the division of revenues. However, their foremost distinction is that, in all cases, 
incremental firm-specific skills as well as firm-based knowledge precede entry into these alliances. The 
rationalization for this is that existence of proprietary knowledge is more important in such alliances 
than the potential for knowledge. Consequently, a diversity of firms with advances in several 
complementary disciplines are recognized as having a competitive advantage over larger firms which 
form structures to develop new technologies.  
These endeavors differ from the cited methods of risk diversification in several respects. As stated, the 
systematic distribution of technical standards through licensing diminishes the technological 
advantages typically held by larger firms in other industries (Gulati, 1995). Also, firms that are 
successful in entirely developing a marketable technological product must disclose this intrinsic 
knowledge to have these proprietary standards incorporated by industry. This has the effect of 
continually disbursing information among multiple competitors (Lamont et. al., 1994; Meznar and 
Nigh, 1994). Accordingly, proprietary knowledge typically held by only the largest organizations in 
lower technology industries does not have the same restrictive influence. Rather, competition is 
typically centered upon the subsequent, incremental development of technology in which the various 
standards are known and the manufacturing processes are widely dispersed. It is in this regard that 
non-linear technological ventures have a distinct competitive advantage over strategic alliances in 
high-technology industries.  
Another distinct advantage of these alliances is that they are intrinsically able to adapt to uncertainty 
and disordered environmental situations. Again, in mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances, 
structure predates the development of knowledge. As these firms spend time merging their distinct 
organizational cultures, they lose their first move advantage. This in turn makes for dissynergies. Also, 
these alliances produce situations in which firms are legally entwined with their technological 
collaborators. The result is a lack of malleability through these obligations. The result is that a change 
in industry's acceptance of developments in any one associated discipline means a failure of the 
alliance, merger, acquisition, or sole development itself. In contrast, non-linear technological ventures 
repeatedly form different technological solutions from the aggregate of advances in the different 
disciplines. The result is that these alliances are able to excel against the above-mentioned 
organizational adaptations and change from the viewpoint of the number of potentially marketable 
technologies that they offer to industry. Furthermore, these alliances are able to bring about these 
technologies at the moment that a suitable solution becomes viable. This solidly contrasts with the 
limited ability of mergers, acquisitions, or strategic alliances that are repeatedly constrained by the 
terms established in their inceptive agreements.  
Hypothesis  
The focus of existing empirical studies has been to determine whether firms which are successful at 
licensing their incremental proprietary knowledge demonstrate more managerial commitment at 
developing organizational structures which promote these technologically cooperative endeavors. To 
date, the results of these empirical studies have been mixed. From the contrary standpoint proposed 
within this article, proprietary technological development has repeatedly been shown to precede the 
formulation of organizational strategies and thus be the determinant of the organizational structures 
that follow. Further, existing empirical findings reveal that, lineartechnological and sole-developmental 
methods offer specific disadvantages such as being contractually bound to a single technological 
innovator in a divergent field or in not having a viable technological product accepted by industry.  
Referring specifically to non-linear behavior, it might be suggested that risk diversification and the 
ability to enter into multiple coalitions enables management not only to seek attractive technological 
cooperative opportunities, but to effectively market their proprietary abilities to the aggregate of 
complementary firms. Through this divergent approach, organizational uncertainty must thus be offset 
through a paradigm shift from convergence to divergence. With it, assumptions must be changed and 
organizations must see themselves as not being determined by the context, but as enacting it. Thus, 
managers must transform their organizations from strict (product) functionalism to (process) 
interpretivism. They must understand that organizational relationships are integral to firm success. In 
non-linear environments: The Process is the Product.  
The following two hypotheses are presented, and are consistent with, this nonlinear perspective. In 
each, organizational change is justified from this conceptual bias. It is the specific intention of these 
hypotheses to illustrate the objectives outlined at the beginning of the article: that a non-linear model 
offers a theoretical justification for delineating effective organizational behaviors within these 
transitory environments.  
H1. If a firm is involved in a merger, acquisition, or a strategic alliance, then it is less likely to earn 
licensing revenues from that respective technology than a firm involved in non-linear technological 
ventures.  
As previously submitted, the prerequisite for entry into mergers, acquisitions, or strategic alliances is 
participation in a legal structure prescribing the development of technology by each respective 
member and while limiting incremental development to the same.  
Accepting these restrictions ultimately increases the limitations that firms have rather than decreasing 
them. Further, the involved organizations are able to produce fewer potentially marketable 
technologies for industry than their rivals. Consequently, it is offered that these firms are less likely to 
actually earn licensing revenues than organizations retaining their ability to enter into non-linear 
technological ventures with the aggregate of firms with advances in the different disciplines.  
H2. If a firm develops a proprietary ability and attempts to solely develop or produce a marketable 
product, then it is less likely to earn revenue than a firm entering into a non-linear technological 
venture to secure collaborative disciplinary knowledge.  
Organizations should weigh the benefits of solely developing products against those of entering into 
several non-linear technological ventures. It is suggested that, in rapidly changing environments that 
share technology through licensing and resist sole development by withholding industry support, sole 
development is inappropriate. Therefore, it is proposed that single-- technology joint ventures will 
yield more revenue than sole development of a product.  
Methodology  
The research methodology that was used in this study consisted of time series analysis of data 
published in the various organizational journals, industry trade publications, and online journals[1]. 
Within these publications were exhaustive listings of each of the organizations involved in specific 
technological fields. Also, industry consumption rates were charted for each of the various 
commercially available products. Past and present product life-cycles were depicted in these journals 
and papers and indicated specific product launch dates, growth rates, maximum sales, and 
intersections (equivalent sales volumes and revenues) between older and incrementally newer 
technologies.  
With respect to the two hypotheses, this comprehensive listing of specific products was used to 
generate a list of final product manufacturers. This was then used to generate licensing information 
and this information was subsequently used to determine the extent of participation by the various 
principals as well as determine their respective revenue. Specifically, revenue information from these 
licensees was gathered from their respective 10-K and 10-Q forms via the Internet from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission's Web pages. Further, detailed information about these licensing 
agreements was found through the documentation contained in each of the organization's footnotes 
on these same forms.  
A sample of 364 agreements were codified and assigned to merger, acquisition, strategic alliance or 
non-linear technological venture categories from the information contained in these publications. 
Remaining licensing agreements were subsequently used to determine which of the leftover 
arrangements were the result of sole organizational attempts to produce a marketable product or to 
manufacture these product themselves. In this manner, the revenues generated from mergers, 
acquisitions, strategic alliances, and attempts to solely produce marketable technologies were 
statistically compared to the revenues generated from non-linear technological ventures to see if 
significant differences exist. Both hypotheses were subjected to ANOVA to test for significant mean 
differences in the dependent variable between non-linear technological ventures and other 
approaches.  
Findings  
The result of the first hypothesis (see Table I) indicates that there are significant differences between 
the dependent variables at the p < 0.01 level of significance. Accordingly, we reject the null 
hypothesis H1 and accept that there is a significant difference in licensing revenue between firms 
involved in mergers, acquisitions, or strategic alliances, and firms involved in non-linear technological 
ventures. In addition, the difference between the dependent variables yields a statistically significant 
result in the manner predicted. Correspondingly, we accept that non-linear technological ventures 
yield significantly higher licensing revenues than mergers, acquisitions, or strategic alliances.  
The result of the second hypothesis (see Table II) also reveals a significant difference between the 
dependent variables at the p < 0.01 level of significance. Here we also reject the null hypothesis H2 
and accept that there is a significant difference in revenue between firms that solely attempt to 
develop or produce a marketable product and those that enter into non-linear technological ventures. 
Again, the difference between the dependent variables yields a result in the manner predicted. Thus, 
we accept that nonlinear technological ventures yield significantly higher revenues than attempts to 
solely produce marketable technologies.  
Respectively, the basis of comparison for both hypotheses is the non-linear technological venture. The 
ultimate result thus becomes that non-linearity and interpretivism are preferable methods of forming 
alliances in these environments.  
Implications for managers and industry  
Decision-makers in high technology firms should pay attention to the effect which rapid organizational 
restructuring may have on the level of licensing revenues. Although essentially uncontrollable in 
nature, the impact of fragmentation within these industries can be circumvented, to a large extent, 
through the implementation of nonlinear organizational forms. High technology firms, particularly 
those highly engaged in research and development activities, may find it prudent to immediately 
license the production of emergent technologies to other firms focused on manufacture rather than to 
tie up capital needed for the subsequent technological development within these markets. Clearly, the 
study implies that these elements play a critical role in the attainment and sustenance of technological 
proficiency over competing firms which do not employ this methodology within the computer industry.  
Managers within these industries must appreciate the importance of maintaining the ability to choose 
among many technological relationships. Issues such as flexibility in adapting to alternative 
technological specifications, increasing organizational ability to communicate across technical 
disciplines, the ability to cooperatively arrive at a set of technological standards, and intangible issues 
such as fairness, reliability, and reputation all must be emphasized within these organizations' 
technological venture strategies. While proprietary technological knowledge in a specific area or 
discipline might be a condition of entry into these technological ventures, these strengths may alone 
be insufficient to remaining essential to an industry where there are often many suppliers offering 
viable alternative proprietary technologies focused at the same end result. The results cited here 
indicate that, within the technologically turbulent environment of the computer peripheral industry, it 
is critical to maintain a competitive equilibrium between the ability to continuously develop proprietary 
technological knowledge and innovations and the ability to maintain and further develop potential 
cooperative relationships with a variety of potential technological collaborators.  
This study empirically demonstrates that the difference between cooperative ventures and the sole 
development of high-technology peripherals underscores the forces driving the development of high-
technology peripheral devices. Smaller developers of technological developments may find advantage 
in the pursuit of business relationships within specific niche markets. To this end, the results imply 
that these developers have a competitive advantage in developing proprietary knowledge focused 
upon integrating successive technological developments toward specific industries. Thus, with respect 
to knowledge of specific industry characteristics, inherent knowledge and the ability to maintain 
cooperative relationships might lead to regular technological involvement. This would then further 
positively influence the firm's cooperative venture abilities, hightechnology involvement, and 
organizational performance.  
This study also demonstrates that, within these industries, success is measured by the ability to be 
perpetually innovative at developing knowledge. Accordingly, developers of proprietary technical 
knowledge may find advantage in discontinuing remaining policies of attempting to physically 
manufacture their successive technological innovations. The results of this study imply that to survive 
in a technologically turbulent environment characterized by perpetual innovation, firms must first 
generate sufficient capital for continual research and development. In addition, it has been shown that 
proprietary knowledge alone is insufficient; thus still more capital is necessary to develop many 
alternative relationships, each with unique technological specifications.  
The final implication for decision-makers is that the sole development of proprietary technological 
innovations has several distinct disadvantages. The first is that shared development of standards and 
technological incrementalism have limited technological peripheral development to be reverse-
compatible with existing technologies and thus evolutionary rather than revolutionary in nature. 
Second, sole development of any product risks the potential for industry indifference without some 
integrative means of support. Lastly, attempting to form coalitions through purchasing organizations 
possessing proprietary knowledge requires a certain period of time and then an additional period of 
time to integrate management and to transfer knowledge. Thus, organizations which employ these 
tactics lose the first move advantage and are regularly beaten to market by alternative, incremental 
technologies. The findings of this study suggest that the emphasis be placed on maintaining the ability 
to continually choose among a variety of relationships for an organization's proprietary technological 
knowledge. Such tactics could offer benefits to each of the organizational structures studied as well as 
limiting total capital expenditures on methods which limit future research and development potential 
while increasing risk.  
Limitations and future research  
The evidence reported in this paper should be interpreted with the understanding of certain 
limitations. First, caution may be exercised in generalizing the present findings too broadly. The study 
focused upon specific segments of the computer peripheral industry, namely, those segments within 
the computer industry that are characterized with rapid technological development and product 
change. The supposition behind this limitation is that it is these segments of the computer industry 
that are the most profitable and consequently are the most fundamental in shaping the industry as a 
whole. Testing the external validity of these findings would likely require replication of this study 
within other industries that are not characterized by the sharing of technology and the shared 
development of standards. Realistically, however, generalization of our research findings may be 
applicable to those industries with similar characteristics such as consumer products that demand 
annual or sequential improvements and whose technologies are easily reverse engineered. Of these 
types of products, there are many.  
Second, the cross-sectional character of the data allows us to conclude on the basis only of 
associations between research and development organizations which are limited in establishing 
industry standards through technological succession and shared technological development. Any 
further speculation should be made with caution, as it is widely acknowledged that larger 
organizations have the collusive ability to forestall technological advances by competitors through a 
variety of means other than through enactment. Undoubtedly, this latter issue is an important and 
challenging task for future researchers in the field. Regardless, it must be conceded that the collusive 
ability of larger organizations has the potential for altering the results achieved by this study within 
the computer industry at this time.  
Third, the present study provides only limited insight into the effect of shared sequential technological 
development within the peripheral spectrum of the personal computer industry. Attributable in part to 
the focus on this specific area of technological development, the evidence provided here indicates the 
presence of a significant correlation between the methods with which research and development firms 
alternatively compete and jointly develop their respective proprietary technologies. The question 
which might be raised is to what extent has prior competition and consensual agreement within the 
industry limited technological development to the incremental forms seen within this study?  
Fourth, a natural extension of this research would be to include other hightechnology industries into 
the study of transitory organizational structures. An immediate industry which comes to mind is that 
of pharmaceuticals. Drawing upon the recent findings that show incremental product development and 
the full disclosure of proprietary knowledge within industries, future researchers can contribute to 
existing knowledge by investigating possible differences in high-technology product development. 
Thus, distinct groups of firms such as: those which develop sequential proprietary knowledge as a by-
product of divergent areas of development; those which develop proprietary knowledge sporadically; 
and those which regularly produce this knowledge because of a continual, directed focus, can be 
compared for possible differences in how they form these transitory structures among firms.  
Finally, it would be of interest to determine if other variables such as differences in organizational size, 
and similar firm and managerial characteristics are considered in determining the level and extent of 
shared technological development through transitory organizational structures. To this end, future 
research studies may pursue the identification of those factors that discriminate between the groups 
of regular and sporadic developers of technological innovation as well as those firms which have 
existing infrastructures for collaborative development of technologies versus those which must develop 
these abilities. Such an investigation would be insightful for technology management practice and the 
sequential development of high-technology products and would positively impact upon the 
development of managerial practices within these environments.  
Footnote 
1 Mergers and Acquisitions, Wall Street Journal, Computer Currents, Computer Life, Computer Retail 
Week, Computer Shopper, Computer Talk, Computing, Computing Connection, and Configurations.  
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Application questions  
1 Does the old adage that "structure should follow strategy" still hold up in all organizational 
environments, or does structure sometimes dictate strategy?  
2 What in practice might a "transitory organization" look like? What would it be like to work in one?  
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